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Abstract 
Effective and efficient DoD acquisition programs require the analysis of a wide range 
of materiel alternatives. Alternative diversity, difficulties in selecting metrics and measuring 
performance, and other factors make the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) difficult. The 
benefits of alternatives should be included in AoA, but cost estimates predominate most 
AoA processes. Incorprating benefits into AoA is particularly difficult because of the 
intangible nature of many important benefits. The current work addresses the need to 
improve the use of benefits in AoA by building a system dynamics model of a military 
operation and integrating it with the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology. The 
synergies may be able to significantly improve the accuracy of KVA estimates in the AoA 
process. A notional mobile weapon system was modeled and calibrated to reflect four 
weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Modeling a hypothetical AoA for upgrading 
one of the UAV indicated that there were potentially significant synergies that can increase 
the number of alternatives that could be analyzed, establishing common units of benefit 
estimates for an AoA, improved reliability of an AoA, and improved justification of AoA 
results. These can improve alternative selection, thereby improving final materiel 







The US defense acquisition process is initiated by the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS), which is one of the three major decision support 
systems used in the DoD to interconnect and arrive at new warfighting capability. The JCIDS 
formulates force requirements with a “top down” approach that serves as both a Joint Force 
integrative process and one that can also hierarchically decompose the complexities of the 
battle spaces and their critical mission elements. It must also be aligned with the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) funding process as a way to 
descend from the strategic to the tactical in acquisition programs and budgets (CJCSI 
3170.01G, 2009). JCIDS uses Capability Based Assessments (CBA) to validate capability 
gaps, to discover solutions such as those addressed by non-materiel-type changes to 
doctrine, organization, training, leadership & education, personnel, or facilities, or to pursue 
materiel solutions. Essential to CBA subprocesses is the knowledge of various functional 
warfighting Joint Capability Areas and how those communities operate within a joint 
paradigm. Functional Capability Boards are organized around top-tier functional areas such 
as Force Application, Logistics, etc.  
Once needs are specifically derived in an area, and it is ascertained that they can 
only be addressed by new materiel, the acquisition community is still often left with either a 
variety of system types or technical approaches within a particular system type to fully 
address that capability need. An in-depth Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) helps sponsors and 
program managers compare options. Examples include manned or unmanned aircraft 
versus a missile, chemical energy versus kinetic energy kill mechanisms, etc. In the past, 
these have also been called Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses, and cost-
effectiveness analyses—all variants of a Business Case Analysis.  
The focus of the current work is on improving the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
process that is used to make these major acquisition decisions. We will demonstrate the use 
of a system dynamics modeling approach that incorporates common units of benefits 
parameters using the KVA methodology and the potential improvements that might result in 
an AoA. 
Problem Description 
In typical weapon system acquisition programs, there is a point where an AoA is 
conducted to select the most viable and cost-effective materiel solution, so that it may be 
pursued into advanced development and production. Often, a selection for advanced 
technical development among competitive system prototypes is needed—a practice that has 
recently become official DoD acquisition policy, but is not a new idea (USD(AT&L) memo, 
September 19, 2007, Subj: Prototyping and Competition). 
System concepts are further clarified during the Materiel Solutions Analysis phase 
and the accompanying AoA process. As part of these processes, programs move toward 
several kinds of evaluative cost comparisons that formulate costs estimates across a 
notional life cycle. In these early stages, programs use analogous and parametric cost 
estimation techniques. Parameters of system performance and key system characteristics 
are selected from technical and operational inputs. Usually, several Key Performance 
Parameters included in the Initial Capability Document are used in the AoA to quantify 





 Simulations help address uncertainty across likely operational contingencies (Ford & 
Dillard, 2008; 2009, May 13-14; 2009, July). Balancing of programmatic and operational 
risks should be accounted for, but costs predominate most analyses because, for major 
weapon systems, they can be huge. Not only must research and development costs be 
considered, but also the production costs, and, beyond that, all of the operating costs of 
spares, diagnostics, maintenance, tools, training manuals, etc., must be estimated.  
While the emphasis is clearly on cost in these stages, operational effectiveness must 
also be considered because that is where benefits are realized. Current guidance does not 
provide a method for estimating benefits in common units. Some feel that the emphasis is 
disproportionately on cost without enough emphasis on benefits. In current guidance (e.g., 
the GAO’s Cost Estimation Guide, 2009, p. 35) benefits are primarily in the form of cost 
avoidance or cost savings. Clearly, these are not equivalent to normal estimates of benefits 
in the business world where revenue is the primary indicator of benefit and is not derived 
from the denominator or cost side of the equation. Monetizing benefits as some form of cost 
savings/avoidance leads to a slippery slope where the only indicator of value, or numerator 
in a productivity equation, such as return on investment (ROI), is a derivative of the 
denominator, i.e., cost. Such predilections inevitably lead to the lowest cost alternatives, 
which may not provide the highest benefits.  
Research Focus 
Benefits, in common units, should be included in AoA to enable higher fidelity 
comparisons among alternatives on the basis of value and not just cost. But how can 
sponsors and program managers best valuate very real and important but intangible 
benefits such as combat effectiveness, survivability, or national security? Lacking a credible 
ability to quantify such subjective or intangible benefits of the capabilities of a system type 
(or technical alternative) is a serious omission in any rigorous analysis of alternatives. The 
third author’s experience includes several recent examples that illustrate the need for more 
than a conventional cost effectiveness analysis to defend a program requirement, or a 
system parameter of technical capability. Often, a particular system parameter of capability 
(e.g., weight, C-130 transportability, vertical take-off and landing) become a metric of 
program life and death, but with notably sparse articulation of empirical benefit to the 
customer/end user. 
The Case of the Javelin Anti-Tank Weapon System  
The Javelin anti-tank weapon system was, when it was conceptualized, merely 
named after its requirement as the Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System–Medium (AAWS–
M). In 1987-89,the US Army tested three competing technologies to fulfill the operational 
need for a one-man-portable anti-armor weapon system in the medium range (1,000–2,000 
meter) category, and replace its aging and ineffective DRAGON weapon system. Principally, 
the weapon was to do the following: be able to defeat current and projected threat armored 
vehicles (including tanks), have a maximum range of at least 2,000 meters, weigh no more 
than 20.5 kg (with under 15.5 kg being desirable), have the ability to be fired from enclosed 
spaces, and be able to engage armored vehicles under cover or in hull defilade. The US 
Marine Corps agreed to these requirements, promising to pay for production items, but not 
to fund research and development. 
In August of 1986, “Proof of Principle” contracts of $30 million each were awarded to 





“Technology Development”) to develop the technologies and conduct a “fly-off” missile 
competition. Each offered the needed capability solutions with differing technologies. Ford 
Aerospace teamed with its partner Loral Systems, offering a laser beam-riding missile. 
Hughes Aircraft teamed with Boeing to offer a fiber-optic guided missile. Texas Instruments 
teamed with Martin-Marietta, offering an imaging infra-red (I2R) or forward looking infra-red 
(FLIR) missile system. Each candidate system also offered some specific operational 
advantages and disadvantages that were almost impossible to quantify in terms of cost: 
• The Ford/Loral Laser Beam Rider required an exposed gunner and man-in-
loop throughout its rapid flight. It was cheapest at an estimated $90,000 “cost 
per kill,” a figure comprised not only of average production unit cost estimates 
but also reliability and accuracy estimates. It was fairly effective in terms of 
potential combat utility, with diminishing probability-of-hit at increasing range. 
• The Hughes/Boeing Fiber-Optic guided prototype enabled an unexposed 
gunner (once launched) and also required man-in-loop throughout its slower 
flight. It was costlier, but less affected by range accuracy with its automatic 
lock-on and guidance in its terminal stage of flight, and even offered target 
switching. It was also more gunner training (learning) intensive, but could 
attack targets from above where their armor was thinnest. 
• The FLIR prototype offered completely autonomous “fire and forget” flight to 
target after launch, was perceived as both costliest and technologically 
riskiest. It would be easiest to train and would be effective to maximum 
ranges by means of its target acquisition sensor and guidance packages. It 
was an outgrowth of a 1980 initiative by the Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency (DARPA) called Tank Breaker that also used “top attack” as a 
more effective means of armored target defeat. 
1988 was a busy year for the AAWS-M industry contractors, as well as the 
government acquirers and program sponsors. All three candidate teams engaged with finally 
building and flight-testing their missile prototypes. They were also submitting their bids to the 
government’s Request for Proposal for the upcoming advanced development phase. On the 
government side, acquirers were evaluating these bids and preparing to award the 36-
month Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase contract, while sponsors 
were completing a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) of the three 
candidate AAWS-M materiel solutions. Each of the teams enjoyed generally successful 
missile flight test outcomes as the “proof of principle” phase ended. Each flew over a dozen 
missiles and achieved a target hit rate of over 60%. 
The Laser Beam Rider candidate emerged the winner of the COEA, presumably 
from weighted cost/efficiency factors. But in a strange twist, the concurrent deliberation of 
the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) instead chose the FLIR candidate, 
presumably because of a bias toward “fire & forget.” As part of a typical capability 
formulation process, technical constraints are deliberately avoided in requirements 
documents, to allow and encourage a maximum range of alternative solutions to the need or 
capability deficiency. While time of flight and gunner survivability were not stated 
requirements in the AAWS-M Joint Required Operational Capability document per se, “fire 
and forget” nevertheless translated into greatly enhanced gunner survivability, and 
overwhelmingly appealed to user representatives (and government developers).  
The EMD contract was awarded in June of 1989 to the Joint Venture team of Texas 





technical problems doubled the expected cost of development and added about eighteen 
more months to the originally planned thirty-six months to complete. This constituted a 
Nunn-McCurdy breach of cost and schedule thresholds, with requisite Congressional 
notifications and formal re-baselining taking the better part of the next year to accomplish. 
Various technical issues plagued the program at this point, with system weight being 
perhaps chief among them.  User representatives convened a Joint Requirements Overview 
Council (JROC) to re-evaluate the maximum weight requirement of 45 pounds and 
increased the program threshold to 49.5 pounds. Clearly, the Army and Marine Corps 
communities wanted the emergent system and its planned capabilities. But that didn’t 
resolve all of AAWS-M’s issues. 
During the months that the program teetered on the brink of termination for its 
technical and business issues, the Director of the OSD Office of Program Analysis and 
Evaluation (DPAE), as a principle member of the DAB, took the program to task stating that 
if the FLIR version could not be shown able to achieve the same $90K “cost per kill” as had 
been estimated for the laser beam-rider, then the program should be terminated and re-
started, changing technologies and pursuing the less risky laser-guided version. The 
principal cost driver of the FLIR technology that enabled fire-and-forget was a 64x64 matrix 
(of heat detectors/pixels) focal plane array (FPA), to be manufactured by one of the Joint 
Venture partners. These tiny micro-chips would comprise almost 14% of the estimated 
average unit production cost (UPC) of the entire missile. The ability of one of the few 
producers in the world to produce them with economically sufficient yield, and to achieve 
their rigorous performance specifications for sensitivity seemed, for a while, to hold the fate 
of the entire program. Intense scrutiny of projected yields and production costs of these 
critical components would determine whether the program was feasible from this aspect 
alone, some believed. But the answer was somewhat ambiguous, with roughly $12k being 
the target for average UPC, given a planned buy quantity of about 70,000. And cost of FPAs 
wasn’t the only problem with them. But it turned out that their benefits could be described in 
a fairly tangible way. 
The AAWS-M FPA specifications were derived from a scenario-based target list of 
potential threat vehicles in different environments of atmospheric temperature, humidity, 
obscuration, etc. When the user community saw that early developmental AAWS-M focal 
plane arrays were not meeting the full specifications, they convened another JROC to allow 
stepped, incremental achievement of target defeat scenarios over time—something we 
would now refer to as evolutionary growth. They stratified performance in terms of levels A, 
B and C to convey degrees of target defeat capability in FPAs—a very unusual move by 
sponsors, having to dissect a requirement to accommodate the pace of technological 
achievement.1 This provided a qualitative assessment of what was achievable and 
satisfactory for system performance. Once again, the communities that needed AAWS-M’s 
capabilities were trying to ease the path forward.  
Fortunately, independent program evaluation teams also reported that FLIR 
technology was progressing and would be achievable within a re-baselined program. This 
joint position, along with wider program advocacy, curtailed the technical and business 
arguments and the fire-and-forget Javelin was allowed to proceed. An additional and more 
capable provider of FPAs was brought in and accelerated as a second source for this critical 
                                                
1 Perhaps not unlike today’s emergence of an Apple iPhone® being followed soon after by release of a 3G-





component. After still more and difficult advanced development program challenges, AAWS-
M eventually became the Javelin—and is known today as one of our most successful 
combat systems. (In the end, soldiers and Marines never had to accept to accept B and C-
level FPA performance, as the full-capable FPA technology did in fact emerge in time for 
fielding. And system weight has been held just below 49.5 pounds throughout its many 
years of production.) 
There are many business and public policy lessons to be learned from the Javelin 
program. Within its long saga from initial concept to modern-day deployment and combat 
use are illustrations of requirements capture, early prototyping, technology readiness, 
modeling and simulation, economic forces of competition, acquisition strategy, decision 
bureaucracy, product discovery, and economies of scale, etc. Perhaps the best lesson 
learned from the case presented here about analyzing alternatives is that a single, unstated, 
qualitative factor of performance (gunner survivability) ultimately drove the choice. Javelin 
had a requirements document with many pages of quantifiable requirements stated as 
measures of performance and effectiveness. But the parameter of system technology that 
promised the most of what was impossible to quantify became the overriding factor in the 
selection of alternatives. A magazine advertisement purchased by the Joint Venture shortly 
after their EMD contract win said it eloquently: “Fire & Forget AAWS-M: The Gunner Wins.” 
The failure of the Javelin program to move to the final solution faster and more directly is 
due in large part to the insufficient articulation of benefits as part of the Analysis of 
Alternatives process.  
Research Question 
As illustrated by the Javelin program, there is a basic need for the use of a common 
units of benefit estimate in the Analysis of Alternatives process. This should lead to including 
common units benefits estimates as well as costs in the acquisition AoAs.  The problem is to 
develop a means to do this more effectively, given the nebulous nature of so many of the 
critical benefits of weapon systems. How can such a method be consistently applied to 
many alternatives across a wide range of operational conditions? The current research 
examines how KVA can be integrated with system dynamics modeling to generate 
defensible common units of benefit estimates that will improve the rigor of the AoA 
process and thereby improve acquisition processes.  
The goals of the current work are:  
• Examine how military operations systems dynamics simulations can be 
combined with the KVA approach, 
• Identify potential advantages and disadvantages of integrating military 
operations simulations and the KVA approach, 
• Investigate the potential of exploiting the benefits from the synergy of SD and 
KVA to improve acquisition AoA processes, and 
• Identify and describe potential implications of the integration on acquisition 
practice. 
Due to the preliminary nature of this proof-of-concept study, precise descriptions of 






Introduction to Knowledge Value Analysis 
In the US Military context, the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology is a new 
way of approaching the problems of estimating the productivity (e.g., in terms of ROI) for 
military capabilities embedded in processes such as the CONOPS for a weapons system. In 
the current study, we posited several alternative CONOPS for a UAV system and used 
system dynamic modeling to evaluate their relative productivity. The KVA approach was 
used to estimate the parameters based on the system dynamic models by providing the 
estimates of the relative productivity (i.e., the ROI2) of each alternative. 
In a broader context, KVA also addresses the requirements of the many Department 
of Defense (DoD) policies and directives previously reviewed by providing a means to 
generate comparable value or benefit estimates for various processes and the technologies 
and people that execute them. It does this by providing a common and relatively objective 
means to estimate the value of new technologies as required in the: 
• Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 that mandates the assessment of the cost benefits 
for information technology investments. 
• Government Accountability Office’s Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide 
for Evaluating Federal Agencies’ IT Investment Decision-Making, Version 1, 
(February 1997) that requires that IT investments apply ROI measures.  
• DoD Directive 8115.01, issued October 2005, that mandates the use of 
performance metrics based on outputs, with ROI analysis required for all 
current and planned IT investments.  
• DoD Risk Management Guidance Defense Acquisition guide book that 
requires alternatives to the traditional cost estimation be considered because 
legacy cost models tend not to adequately address costs associated with 
information systems or the risks associated with them.  
KVA is a methodology that describes all organizational outputs in common units. 
This provides a means to compare the outputs of all assets (human, machine, information 
technology) regardless of the aggregated outputs produced. Thus, it provides insights about 
the productivity level of processes, people, and systems in terms of a ratio of common units 
of output produced by each asset (a measure of benefits) divided by the cost to produce the 
output   By capturing the value of knowledge embedded in an organization’s core 
processes, employees and technology, KVA identifies the actual cost and value of a people, 
systems, or processes.  Because KVA identifies every process required to produce an 
output and the historical costs of those processes, unit costs and unit values of outputs, 
processes, functions or services are calculated.  An output is defined as the end-result of an 
organization’s operations; it can be a product or service, as shown in Figure 1. 
                                                
2 ROI is defined as the revenue-cost/cost where revenue is defined as the price per common unit of benefit using 
a market comparables approach. Given that the price per common unit is a constant, precision in estimating the 
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For the purpose of the systems dynamics model developed for this study, KVA was 
used to describe the outputs of all the processes and subprocesses in common units. This 
allowed us to make their relative performance (e.g., productivity, ROIs) comparable. KVA 
was used to measure the value added by the human capital assets (i.e., military personnel 
executing the processes) and the system assets by analyzing the processes performances. 
KVA provided a means to set the systems dynamic model parameters so that the results 
would provide a means to compare the performance of various approaches to the system 
problem.  
By capturing the value of knowledge embedded in systems and in use in operators of 
the processes, KVA identified the productivity of the system-process alternatives. Because 
KVA identified every process output required to produce the final aggregated output, the 
common unit costs and the common unit values were estimated. This allowed for the 
benchmarking of various systems and the processes they support with any other similar 
processes across the military.  
The KVA methodology has been applied in over 80 projects within the DoD, from 
flight scheduling applications to ship maintenance and modernization processes to the 
current project analyzing several alternative approaches to the system alternatives problem. 
In general, the KVA methodology was used for this study because it could:  
• Compare alternative approaches modeled with a systems dynamics model in 
terms of their relative productivity, 
• Allocate value and costs to common units of output, 
• Measure value added by the system alternatives based on the outputs each 
produced, and 
• Relate outputs to cost of producing those outputs in common units. 
Describing processes in common units also permits, but does not require, market 
comparable data to be generated, particularly important for non-profits like the US Military. 
Using a market comparables approach, data from the commercial sector can be used to 
estimate price per common unit, allowing for revenue estimates of process outputs for non-
profits. This also provides a common units basis to define benefit streams, regardless of the 





KVA differs from other nonprofit ROI models because it can allow for revenue 
estimates, enabling the use of traditional accounting, financial performance, and profitability 
measures at the sub-organizational level. KVA can rank processes or process alternatives 
by their relative ROIs. This assists decision-makers in identifying how much various 
processes or process alternatives add value.  
In KVA, value is quantified in two key metrics: Return-on-Knowledge (ROK: 
revenue/cost) and ROI (revenue-investment cost/investment cost). The raw data from a KVA 
analysis can become the input into the ROI models and various forecasting techniques such 
as real options analysis, portfolio optimization, Monte Carlo simulation. By tracking the 
historical volatility of price and cost per unit as well as ROI, it is possible to establish risk (as 
compared to uncertainty) distributions, which is important for accurately estimating the 
forecasted values for portfolio optimization and real options analysis. 
Introduction to System Dynamics 
The system dynamics methodology applies a control theory perspective to the 
design and management of complex human systems. System dynamics combines servo-
mechanism thinking with computer simulation to analyze systems. It is one of several 
established and successful approaches to systems analysis and design (Flood & Jackson, 
1991; Lane & Jackson, 1995; Jackson, 2003). Forrester (1961) develops the methodology's 
philosophy, and Sterman (2000) specifies the modeling process with examples and 
describes numerous applications. The methodology has been extensively used for this 
purpose, including studying development projects. The system dynamics perspective 
focuses on how the internal structure of a system impacts system and managerial behavior 
and, thereby, performance over time. The approach is unique in its integrated use of stocks 
and flows, causal feedback, and time delays to model and explain processes, resources, 
information, and management policies. Stocks represent accumulations or backlogs of work, 
people, information, or other portions of the system that change over time. Flows represent 
the movement of those commodities into, between, and out of stocks. The methodology’s 
ability to model many diverse system components (e.g., work, people, money, value), 
processes (e.g., design, technology development, production, operations, quality 
assurance), and managerial decision-making and actions (e.g., forecasting, resource 
allocation) makes system dynamics useful for modeling and investigating military operations, 
the design of materiel, and acquisition.  
When applied to acquisition programs, system dynamics has focused on how 
performance evolves in response to interactions among development strategy (e.g., 
evolutionary development versus traditional), managerial decision-making (e.g., scope 
developed in specific blocks), and development processes (e.g., concurrence). System 
dynamics is appropriate for modeling acquisition because of its ability to explicitly model 
critical aspects of development projects. System dynamics models of development projects 
are purposefully simple relative to actual practice to expose the relationships between 
causal structures and the behavior and performance that they create. Therefore, although 
many processes and features of system design and participants interact to determine 
performance, only those that describe features related to the topic of study are included. 
The importance of deleted features can be tested when system dynamics is used to test the 





Based on the preceding and the authors’ experience with system dynamics, there 
appears to be an opportunity to exploit the capabilities of the system dynamics methodology 
to make the Knowledge Value Added approach more accurate.   
Research Methodology 
In the current work, Knowledge Value Added and system dynamics were integrated 
to test their ability to improve the precision of AoAs in acquisition programs. A generic 
structure of a mobile weapon system process was first developed and tested using the 
system dynamics methodology. Then, KVA value and cost estimates were operationalized 
in the system dynamics model. The model was calibrated to reflect four extant weaponized 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). One of those calibrations was used as the basis for 
using the model in a hypothetical AoA for upgrading the UAV to address a different type of 
target. Simulation results were analyzed to test the ability of the system dynamics model to 
estimate benefits streams using KVA in terms of the relative value added of the capabilities 
of the system.  
A Generic Model of Mobile Weapons Use 
The model has three sectors: weapons movement, target evolution, and KVA 
analysis. As will be described, the model structure simulates two critical aspects of mobile 
weapon system operations: 1) the support and movement of the weapon and 2) target 
evolution from identification through confirmation of destruction.  
The Weapons Movement Sector 
The Weapons Movement sector of the model simulates the positions and 
movements of weapons (e.g., individual UAVs or Javelin gunners). Figure 2 shows the 
positions that weapons (generically called “assets”) can take (boxes) and the rates of their 
movements from one position to another (arrows between boxes). It is assumed that the 
total number of assets remains constant, i.e., no weapons are added or lost during 
operations. This assumption can be relaxed when modeling a specific asset. The movement 
of weapons is a subprocess of operating the weapon system that adds value and imbeds 
learning into tools, requires learning time for operators to be capable of doing, and requires 
processing time to accomplish. Therefore, the completion of moving weapons to the station 
and back to the base is an output of that subprocess and an input to the KVA analysis. The 
combination of the two movements “Assets arrive at station rate” and “Assets arriving as 
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Figure 1. Positions and Movement of Weapons during Operations 
Each rate in the weapons sector describes the average movement of the weapons in the 
accumulation that precedes the rate. Each rate is defined with the number of weapons 
preparing for that rate (to leave base or station) or event (to arrive at station or base) and 
the average time spent by a weapon in the preceding accumulation. For example, the 
(average) “Assets leaving base for station” rate is equal to the number of assets at the base 
divided by the average time that a weapon spends at the base between trips to the station. 
This formulation increases the average departure rate with more weapons at the base and 
decreases the average departure rate if weapons stay at the base longer. The average time 
at the base is characteristic of particular assets and can generate different behaviors and 
performances across weapons and configurations.   
The Target Evolution Sector  
The target evolution sector of the model simulates the development of targets 
through five subprocesses of system operations.  
1. Acquire target: Includes detection, recognition, location, classification 
(identification), and confirmation (Lombardo, 2003; Global Security, 2010).  
2. Fire support coordination: Allocates targets to weapons by a group of 
people that have access to information about the battlefield situation, and 
doctrine, major systems, significant capabilities and limitations and often their 
TTP [tactics, techniques and procedures] (Williams, 2001). 
3. Fire mission development: Prepares specific instructions and target 
information for transmission to the weapons team and to the weapon (e.g., 
target location coordinates).  
4. Engage target: Weapons operators (e.g., pilots for UAV) maneuver the 
weapon within striking distance of the target, enter the target coordinates and 
launch munitions . 
5. Battlefield assessment: Often the same asset as was used for target 






In the model, targets evolve through these stages in an “aging chain” structure of 
sequential accumulations (backlogs + work in progress, referred to here as backlogs) and 
(sub)processes that drain those backlogs and contribute to the backlog of the next 
downstream subprocess. Figure 3 shows the conditions of targets (boxes) and the rates of 
their movements from one condition to another (arrows between boxes) due to 
subprocesses. The movements “Acquire target completion rate,” “Fire support coordination 
to asset,” “Fire mission completion rate,” “Engage target,” and “Battlefield assessment rate” 
are subprocesses that add value, imbed learning in tools, require learning time for operators 
to be capable of doing, and require processing time to complete. Therefore, they are each 
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Figure 2. Accumulations and Movements of Targets in Weapon System Operations 
In addition to the primary flows of targets through the subprocesses, the targets 
sector models three common causes of mission failure: 1) hitting the target but failing to 
destroy it, 2) missing the target, and 3) missing the target and losing the location information 
needed to engage the target again (e.g., because the target moved). Each cause moves the 
target to a different condition in the target aging chain. Hitting the target but failing to destroy 
it (e.g., a hardened target) requires reengagement but often no additional targeting 
information. After Battlefield assessment, these targets are returned to the Target 
engagement backlog. Missing the target (e.g., a small target) requires that the fire mission 
be developed again to re-aim the weapon prior to reengagement. Therefore, these targets 
are returned to the Targets in fire mission development backlog after Battlefield assessment. 
Losing the target (e.g., a fast moving vehicle) requires that the target be reacquired. 
Therefore, these targets are returned to the Targets being acquired backlog after Battlefield 
assessment.  
In a manner similar to the modeling of the movement of weapons, the rates in the 
targets sector describe the average movement of targets between backlogs. The primary 
rates in the aging chain are defined by the number of targets in the backlogs of the 
subprocess and the average time required to perform the subprocess. The average time 
required to perform the subprocess is characteristic of particular subprocesses (e.g., 
different engagement durations for different weapons) and can generate different behavior 





backlog (Targets in fire support coordination and Battlefield assessment backlog) the total 
outflow is split between the flows with a percent that leaves the stock through each outflow. 
The return flows are each a fraction of the Battlefield assessment rate. Those fractions are 
based on the ability of the weapon to successfully destroy, hit, and not lose targets. 
Therefore, like in practice, different weapon alternatives (e.g., range, payload, dash speed) 
impact mission success. The model use section of this report describes how these features 
of the model were used to describe operational scenarios and weapon configurations. The 
fraction of the targets that are returned due to being hit but not destroyed (to engagement 
backlog), missed (to mission development backlog), or lost (to target acquisition backlog) 
battlefield assessment rate are described with the probability of destruction if the target is hit 
with the ordinance (p(kill if hit)) or p(kill)), the probability of the weapon hitting the target with 
ordinance (p(hit)), and the probability of not losing the target if it is missed with the 
ordinance (p(not lose)), respectively.3 The probabilities are determined by comparing the 
ability of a weapon to successfully destroy, hit, and not lose targets to the characteristics of 
the target and a function that describes how the weapon’s ability compared to the target 
impacts weapon performance. More specifically, the probability of kill is modeled with the 
weapon’s payload compared to the lethal payload (i.e., ordinance size required to kill); 
probability of hit is modeled with the weapon’s dash speed compared to the target’s speed; 
and the probability of not losing the target is modeled with the weapon’s range compared to 
the target’s distance from the base. Therefore:  
p(kill) = fk(Payload / Lethal payload) 
p(hit) = fh(Dash speed / Target speed) 
p(not lose) = fnl(Range / Target distance from base) 
where: 
p(kill) - probability of destruction if the target is hit with the ordinance 
p(hit) - probability of the weapon hitting the target with ordinance 
p(not lose) - probability of not losing the target if it is missed with the 
ordinance 
The three functions that estimate the probabilities based on the ratios are assumed 
to be simple but realistic relations that include the entire range of possible conditions.4 The 
function relating the Payload/Lethal payload ratio to the probability of kill is assumed to 
increase linearly from p(kill)=0 when the ratio is zero (i.e., no payload prevents any chance 
of target destruction) to p(kill)=100% when the ratio is greater than or equal to 1 (i.e., if the 
payload exceeds the lethal payload the target is assumed to be destroyed if it is hit). The 
function relating the Dash speed/Target speed ratio to the probability of the weapon hitting 
the target with ordinance assumes that the vehicle will “chase” a moving target and that the 
faster the vehicle is then the closer it can get to the target before releasing ordinance, 
increasing the likelihood of hitting the target with the ordinance. However, there is always 
some possibility of missing a target even if the vehicle is faster than and, therefore, close to 
the target. The function is assumed to have an elongated “S” shape from p(hit)=0 when the 
ratio is zero (i.e., no Dash speed prevents hitting the target) to p(hit)=90% when the ratio is 
greater than or equal to three (i.e., high likelihood of hit if weapon speed far exceeds target 
                                                
3 The probability of not losing a target is used instead of the probability of losing a target to retain a “bigger is 
better” standard for all three measures and, therefore, facilitate intuitive understanding of the model.  





speed.5 The function relating the Range/Target distance from base ratio to the probability of 
not losing the target if it is missed with the ordinance assumes that the vehicle will move 
toward the target but that the target may also move, sometimes closer to the vehicle and 
sometimes away from it. When the target moves away from the vehicle it may move out of 
the vehicle’s range, causing the vehicle to lose the target. The function is assumed to have 
a stretched out “S” shape from p(not lose)=0 when the ratio is zero (i.e., no weapon range 
causes the vehicle to always lose the target) to p(not lose)=95% when the ratio is greater 
than or equal to 1.8, reflecting some chance of losing the target even if it is well within the 
vehicle’s range.   
The KVA Sector 
The KVA metrics were fully operationalized within the system dynamics model. The 
KVA sector uses operations information from the weapons and targets sectors of the model 
and characteristic descriptors of weapons to generate relative value metrics for each 
subprocess (including weapons capability outputs) of the UAV operations. KVA generates a 
productivity ratio that reflects output/input. If monetized, this ratio can be a traditional 
benefit:cost ratio (e.g., ROI if benefits are monetized as a form of revenue surrogate). Other 
measures of benefits and costs can also be used, as long as there are common units in the 
numerator (benefits) and all the cost units of all the contributors to the denominator are the 
same (as is most often the case because costs are almost always monetized), so they can 
each be aggregated. At each point in time, each subprocess’s productivity is the benefits it 
has generated divided by the costs to generate those benefits (i.e., output/input).The model 
includes both monetized and time-based KVA metrics. However, it was decided that the 
current model would be simpler to interpret by using the non-monetized common units of 
output (as described in terms of the units of time it would take the average person to learn 
how to produce the outputs) as the numerator. This results in the output (i.e., common units 
of learning time)/input (cost to produce the outputs) standard definition of productivity.  
A time-based application of KVA uses Learning Time to quantify benefits and Touch 
Time to quantify costs. Learning time captures the benefits derived from human processing 
(e.g., flying the vehicle), automated processes (e.g., take offs and landings), and 
(importantly) technologies integrated into the weapon. One of several ways to quantify a 
subprocess’s Learning Time is to estimate the average time required for a common point of 
reference learner to be trained and become competent in performing the subprocess. Each 
subprocess is assigned a Unit Learning Time that reflects the relative (compared to other 
subprocesses) complexity of the subprocess.  
The denominator of KVA subprocess productivity ratios represents subprocess 
costs. Each subprocess is assigned a Unit Touch Time that reflects the relative (compared 
to other subprocesses) effort required to perform the subprocess. The total time spent 
performing a subprocess at any given time is the product of the average time required for 
the subprocess and the number of performances of the subprocess. Therefore, a set of 
equations for estimating the costs of a single subprocess in each time period are: 
Subprocess learning Time accumulated to date = ∑ (Rate of subprocess operation *  
                                                
5 The assumed function relating the dash speed/target speed to the probability of hitting the target is probably 
lower than current experience, but is used to reflect the change in targets described in the Model Use section of 





Subprocess unit learning time) * dt  
Subprocess touch time accumulated to date = ∑ (Rate of subprocess operation *  
Subprocess unit touch time * dt 
Subprocess Productivity = Subprocess learning time accumulated to date /  
Subprocess touch time accumulated to date 
Learning Times and Touch Times are also aggregated across subprocesses to 
estimate the productivity or the entire operation. This allows the comparison of different 
asset configurations (alternatives).  
Model Calibration and Testing 
The KVA+SD model was calibrated to the operations of four actual weaponized 
UAVs. The operations included the following subprocesses: 
1. acquire target 
2. fire support coordination 
3. fire mission development 
4. move weapons 
5. engage targets 
6. battlefield assessments 
Three of the four actual UAVs are operational: Predator, Sky Warrior, and Reaper. 
The fourth UAV is the X-47B. Basic characteristics relating to performance were collected 
for the four UAVs from publicly available sources (e.g., Global Security, 2010). That 
information included vehicle range, total mission time, time on station, dash speed, and 
payload. In some cases, multiple versions of the vehicle with different characteristics have 
been developed. In these cases, a single version was selected and used. Other information 
was estimated for each vehicle’s operations, including learning and processing times for 
each subprocess. Reasonable assumptions were used in making these estimates, such as 
that the time required to engage a target after arriving on station is inversely proportional to 
the vehicle’s dash speed (i.e., faster dash speeds reduce the time required to engage). 
These estimates are rough, but adequate for this proof-of-concept study, which seeks to 
determine if the model is capable of reflecting differences in characteristics in KVA 
parameters, not predict actual outcomes.  
The model was tested using standard tests for system dynamics models (Forrester & 
Senge, 1980; Sterman, 2000), including for structural similarity to the actual system, 
reasonable behavior over a wide range of input values, and behavior similarity to actual 
systems. Basing the model on previously validated models, the literature improves the 
model’s structural similarity to actual acquisition projects, as practiced. Model behavior (e.g., 
simulated sizes of backlogs for subprocesses and rates of performing operations) were 
compared to typical behavior and found to be similar. For example, before operations start 
at the beginning of the operational scenario (described in what follows) the backlogs are 
empty and no operations are being performed. The appearance of targets increases 
subprocess backlogs and rates of operation as weapons leave base and subsequently 
arrive on station, targets are acquired, fire coordinated, missions developed, targets 





In the evolution of targets, these backlogs and subprocesses increase sequentially 
through the series of operations. The growth of operations and backlogs slows as capacities 
adjust to demand (backlog sizes), until the operations are in dynamic equilibrium conditions 
with sizes of backlogs and operations rates remaining within a relatively narrow range. This 
represents “steady state” operations that could be continued for a significant period of time, 
e.g., until damage to weapons or maintenance (not included in the current model) change 
weapon availability. Model behavior was also tested with extreme input values such as 
perfect operations (e.g., probability of hit=100%) and very large versus very small number of 
weapons and targets as well as more typical conditions. Model behavior remained 
defensible across wide ranges of input values, including extreme values. These tests 
increase confidence that the model generates realistic operational process behavior 
patterns due to the same causal relations found in the type of operations investigated (i.e., 
generates “the right behavior for the right reasons”).  
The operational scenario was described with the quantity and characteristics of the 
targets.6 A stream of targets entered the target acquisition backlog at a steady rate of five 
targets per minute. The target distance from the base was assumed to vary uniformly from 
400-1100nm. This describes targets that range from being closer to the weapon’s base than 
the shortest weapon’s range to targets that are farther from the base than the longest 
weapon’s range. The speed of the targets was assumed to vary uniformly from 50 to 250 
nm. This describes targets that range from those that are immobile to targets that are faster 
than the fastest weapon. The payload required to destroy the target if hit (i.e., lethal 
payload) was assumed to vary uniformly from 400 to 1,000 lbs. This describes targets that 
range from being very soft to very hardened. 
KVA productivities for the six subprocesses and the cumulative for those processes 
for the four Weaponized UAVs are shown in Table 1. For example, the KVA productivity 
ratios for the Fire Mission Development subprocess for the four UAV are 943 (Predator), 
3,122 (Reaper), 1,222 (Sky Warrior), and 3,962 (X-47B). They represent the benefits 
(output) per unit of cost (input) and, therefore, can also be interpreted as a measure of the 
return on the investment, in percent. These values remain constant in the model after steady 
state operations have been established. As an example of the components of the ratios, the 
Fire Mission Development subprocess ratio for the Predator (943) is the quotient of the 
accumulated benefits (e.g., after 5 hours of operations) of 79,684 learning-time hours and 
84.5 processing-time hours. In the simulated steady state operations this accumulated 
learning time hours increases at a rate of 301 learning-time hours per minute (the product of 
the estimated 500 learning-time hours per fire development operation and an average fire 
development rate of 0.6 targets developed per minute) and the processing-time hours 
increases at a rate of 0.3 hours per minute (the product of the estimated 30 minute 
processing time to develop a fire mission and the same average fire development rate of 0.6 
targets developed per minute). Transitional periods (e.g., start or end of operations) or other 
non-steady state operations can generate ratios that vary over time.  
Table 1. KVA Productivity Ratios  
                                                
6 Although a single operational environment was simulated for this research, multiple and different 
environments can be simulated. Examples of characteristics of the operational scenario that can be elaborated to 









Acquire targets 377 377 377 377
Fire support coordination 189 189 189 189
Fire mission development 943 3122 1222 3962
Move weapons 50 23 44 607
Engage targets 5094 70761 15212 254736
Battlefield assessment 377 377 377 377















Note that, as described above, these productivities are ratios of accumulated 
learning time divided by accumulated processing time. Therefore, they are relative values. 
As expected, the three productivities for the subprocesses that are not impacted by the 
characteristics of the vehicle (Acquire targets Fire support coordination, and Battlefield 
assessment) do not change. These subprocesses are not impacted by different vehicles 
because the subprocess is the same for all of these vehicles. The application of system 
dynamics and KVA to the Analysis of Alternatives of other system alternatives such as 
improved logistics or vehicle technology used for recognizing and indentifying targets would 
generate changes in these KVA productivities. However, three important subprocesses that 
do impact total product productivity (“Weapons” row in Table 1) do vary (Fire mission 
development, Move weapons, and Engage targets).  
Some of the ratios in Table 1 are relatively large when compared to returns on 
investment experienced in many industries, especially for the engage targets subprocess. A 
primary reason is that the numerator of these ratios includes the benefits of the technologies 
incorporated into the UAV for target engagement purposes. These technologies are 
extremely complex, are reflected in very large learning-time hours that are accumulated 
each time a target is engaged, and, therefore, generate high productivity ratios. Similarly, 
the denominator of these ratios reflects the time required to perform the subprocess, e.g., 
engage a target after it has been acquired, fire support coordinated, fire mission developed, 
and the UAV moved to station. Actual engagement times are relatively short for these UAV, 
further increasing the KVA productivity ratios for the engage target subprocess. Differences 
in learning-times across the UAV reflect their relative performance (e.g., automation of 
subprocesses previously performed by humans) and technologies are the primary causes of 
differences in the ratios across UAV in Table 1. Therefore, it is reasonable that the very 
large benefits of the under-development X-47B with its extremely advanced technology 
generate the largest ratios. Improved estimates of learning-times and processing times can 
improve the accuracy of these ratios. However, comparing the KVA productivity ratios for the 
engage targets subprocess with the ratios for the move weapons subprocess that is simpler 
(lower numerator) and takes longer (larger denominator) indicates that the rank order of the 
ratios reflects the relative returns of the different subprocesses.  
Based on these and additional tests, the model is considered useful for the 





Using System Dynamics and KVA to Improve AoA 
Consider the following hypothetical example of the use of an integrated system 
dynamics/KVA model to improve the productivity estimates supporting an Analysis of 
Alternatives. Assume that a new version of the Predator UAV is being developed to enable it 
to engage opposing UAVs. Due to the much higher speeds and agility of UAVs compared to 
most land-based targets, the fraction of targets missed is expected to be higher than that 
currently experienced with the Predator. The acquisition program management team has 
access to some, but limited, resources (e.g., money, expert developer time until required 
delivery, technology development capabilities, approvals) to improve performance. Different 
stakeholders value payload, dash speed, and range differently and want the program 
management to recommend different improvements. Therefore, program management 
expects a rigorous review of its Analysis of Alternatives process and the results that will 
recommend one (and only one) of the improvements. As part of justification of the AoA 
decision, stakeholders of the two solutions not recommended are certain to require 
explanations of how and how much the recommended improvement impacts operational 
performance compared to the improvements that were not recommended. Cost would, most 
likely, be their primary economic consideration as evidenced by the earlier case study 
examples. However, our analysis will focus on value compared to cost in terms of the 
capabilities of the systems. 
Many alternatives have been proposed and are being considered. A few examples 
are7 as follows:   
• Increase the size of the power plant, which can be used to increase the 
vehicle’s payload, dash speed, or a combination of both. This requires an 
increase in fuel capacity to not reduce range.  
• Redesign the transmission, which will increase the vehicle’s dash speed.  
• Increase the fuel tank size, which will increase the vehicle’s range but 
decrease its dash speed unless the power plant is also increased.  
• Reduce the time required at base between trips to station, which increases 
the time that the vehicle is on station and available for missions. 
Performing detailed analysis of all the possible alternatives, such as by building and 
testing prototypes or very detailed simulations, often exceeds the resources of acquisition 
programs. Therefore, program managers are faced with the challenge of reducing a long list 
of potential alternatives to those that should definitely be included in the program, those that 
should be investigated further for potential inclusion, and those that should be rejected. The 
integration of system dynamics and KVA provided a timely and inexpensive means of 
evaluating all potential alternatives and reducing the “long list” of potential alternatives to a 
“short list” to be pursued or investigated further based on an objective and justifiable 
process. To do this, first the operation of the system with each potential alternative is 
simulated and the simulation model is used to calculate the KVA productivity ratios for the 
subprocesses and system as a whole. Table 2 provides an example of a portion of such an 
analysis for the hypothetical upgrading of the Predator UAV using the model described 
above.
                                                
7 There are interdependencies and tradeoffs in these alternatives, such as needing to increase the power plant 
size to maintain a given dash speed if the fuel tank size is increased. These are ignored here for simplicity. 
However, in application to an actual program developers would describe specific sets of features (e.g., possible 

















Predator Base Case 943 50 5,094 705 0.0%
Increase fuel capacity 
100%
1,886 50 5,094 951 34.9%
Increase fuel capacity 50% 1,415 50 5,094 831 17.9%
Increase Power plant 
100% for payload
849 50 7,641 771 9.4%
Increase Power plant 50% 
for payload
849 50 7,641 771 9.4%
Redesign transmission for 
100% faster dash speed
943 100 10,188 741 5.1%
Redesign transmission for 
50% faster dash speed
943 75 7,641 727 3.1%
Increase Power plant 
100% for dash speed
849 100 10,188 717 1.7%
Increase Power plant 50% 
for dash speed
849 75 7,641 702 ‐0.4%
Reduce time at base 50% 943 52 5,094 699 ‐0.9%














The KVA productivity ratios are repetitive for some subprocesses across alternatives. 
This is partially because some alternatives do not change the impact on some subprocesses 
and partially because of the limited number of system interactions incorporated into this 
proof of concept model. However, the KVA+SD modeling results are adequate to show how 
more accurate results might be used in an AoA of these potential capabilities upgrades. 
Based on the results above, a program manager can assess the relative value-added of the 
eleven alternatives (including no-change as reflected by the Base Case) analyzed. 
Comparison to the base case (e.g., the existing vehicle in the case of the Predator upgrade) 
provides an estimate of relative performance improvement. Sorting the improvements 
provided by potential alternatives in decreasing order (Table 2) lists alternatives from most 
attractive (Increase fuel capacity 100%) to least attractive (Reduce time at base 50%). The 
AoA suggests that, if adequate resources are available, the alternative that improves the 
system the most is to increase the fuel capacity 100% because it improves the development 





the program should attempt to increase the fuel capacity by 50% for similar reasons. The 
program manager can also delete reducing time at the base and a 50% increase in power 
plant capacity that is used to increase dash speed from consideration since they do not 
improve performance. Certainly, other factors must be incorporated into a complete AoA 
(most notably development costs), but the results of the KVA analysis using the system 
dynamics model provide valuable information for making final recommendations.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
Summary 
The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) approach to including benefits in Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) was integrated with a system dynamics model of weapon systems 
operations to investigate the potential of their integration to improve the accuracy of KVA 
productivity ratios and, thereby, AoA. An integrated model was developed for a generic 
mobile weapons system and calibrated to four existing weaponized Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV). Six basic subprocesses of operations using the weapons were included in 
the simulation. KVA productivity ratios for each subprocess for each UAV were calculated, 
compared, and used to explain how the simulation and KVA approach work together to 
generate quantitative assessments of the relative value-added of each subprocess and 
whole weapon systems. A hypothetical upgrade program to one of the UAV was also 
simulated to demonstrate how the integrated model can be used to evaluate alternative 
upgrades and justify AoA decisions.  
Evaluation of Results  
An Analysis of Alternatives based on an integrated system dynamics/KVA model 
provides program management teams with several kinds of valuable information.   
• Quantified Measures of Improvement that include Benefits: Measures of 
subprocesses and the weapon system as a whole are quantified using a 
common set of assumptions and values (those incorporated into the 
simulation model). Therefore, differences in ratios and the implied relative 
value of different alternatives are due to the differences in the alternatives 
themselves.  
• Overall System Improvement Estimates: The weapon (versus subprocess) 
-productivity ratios reflect changes in total product operations. If adequate 
resources are available to adopt at least one alternative, then a list of 
alternatives ranked by overall system improvement (e.g., Table 2) can be 
used to “triage” alternatives into those that should definitely be pursued, 
those that require more investigation before deciding, and those that should 
be abandoned. For example, based on the right-hand column, Table 2 
suggests that increasing the fuel capacity should be pursued before 
redesigning the transmission and that reducing the time at the base should 
not be considered further.  
• Guidance for Alternative Selection: The analysis specifically identifies 
which alternatives improve which subprocesses and the whole weapon 





capacity increases the Fire mission development subprocess most and three 
alternatives significantly improve the engage target subprocess most.  
• Justification of Analysis of Alternatives Decisions: When used with the 
simulation model, the KVA productivity ratios can help explain and justify 
Analysis of Alternatives decisions by providing a means of describing how 
each alternative impacts operations, subprocesses, and performance. For 
example, in the UAV case above, increasing power plant size increases the 
payload, which increases the Payload/Lethal payload ratio, which increases 
the probability of destruction if hit (p(kill)), which decreases the return flow 
“Incomplete kill rate” from the Battlefield Assessment Backlog to the Target 
engagement backlog (Figure 3). This reduces the average number of times 
that a target must be engaged to be destroyed, thereby improving the 
productivity of the engage target subprocess. 
• Guidance for Further Investigation: In addition to suggesting better and 
worse alternatives to pursue, an integrated system dynamics/KVA model can 
provide guidance for further investigation of alternatives by indicating which 
subprocesses each alternative improves. For example, Table 2 indicates that 
the reason increasing fuel capacity improves performance is it improves the 
Fire mission development subprocess. The model (Figure 3) indicates that 
this occurs by increasing the vehicle range, which reduces the likelihood of 
losing a target if it is missed with ordinance. Acquisition program managers 
can use this information to focus further investigation and development of this 
alternative on Fire mission development to assure that these improvements in 
the specific operations identified with the model are realized during the 
alternative’s development.   
It is important to note that neither a system dynamics model nor a KVA analysis of 
this system alone can reasonably produce these results. Only by integrating system 
dynamics and the KVA approach are the benefits above available. Based on the modeling 
and assessment above, we conclude that integrated system dynamics/KVA models can 
significantly improve the Analysis of Alternatives and, thereby, acquisition.  
Implications for Practice 
The current work indicates that acquisition can be improved by using integrated 
system dynamics/KVA models in the Analysis of Alternatives. The rigorous development and 
use of integrated system dynamics/KVA models can have important implications for 
acquisition practice, including:   
• The number of alternatives that can be analyzed with KVA can be increased 
due to the relative ease of reflecting alternatives in the operations simulation 
model compared to manually developing forecasts for use in KVA analysis. 
This increases the likelihood of identifying and selecting the optimal 
alternative.  
• Justifications of AoA decisions can become stronger due to program 
managers having the ability to causally trace from specific potential and 
selected alternatives through their impacts on specific subprocesses and 





• Justifications of AoA decisions can become more robust because they can 
reflect an analysis of a wider range of alternatives and more alternatives.   
• Results of AoA can become more consistent through the use of a single, 
integrated model of system operations and KVA metrics instead of separate 
operations and value-added models.  
• System dynamics/KVA models may be used to baseline product performance 
during the acquisition process. Performance of the product can be tracked 
over time and used to improve the model and thereby performance forecasts 
and AoA later in acquisition.  
• Program management will select better alternatives due to the 
implications for practice above. This will generate more effective and 
potentially cheaper materiel solutions.  
In addition, improving AoA and acquisition through integrated system dynamics/KVA 
models can improve CONOPS. The Javelin case study described previously in this report 
provides a vivid example of the ability of acquisition in general and improved AoA such as 
through integrated system dynamics/KVA modeling to impact tactics and strategy. Upon 
receipt and use of Javelin, operators expressed surprise that its range was twice that of the 
weapon it replaced. That increased range initiated improvements to tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (ttp) such as the use of Javelin to detonate Improvised Explosive Devices. This, 
in turn, can generate changes to strategies. Accurate forecasts of product subprocess 
performance (e.g., accuracy at longer range) can be used to plan CONOPS improvements 
before product delivery.  
It is important to note that the purpose of the simulations of operations developed 
and illustrated in the current work is to capture the relative benefits and costs of different 
materiel alternatives, not to simulate the impacts of operations on opposing forces. The 
usefulness of models can only be judged in relation to the specific purpose for which they 
are built (Sterman, 2000). Therefore, because the purpose of integrated system dynamics 
and KVA models is to improve AoA, those models should be developed, assessed, and 
used separately from force-on-force and other simulations of operations developed for other 
purposes.   
Future Work 
The current proof-of-concept work has demonstrated the potential of integrated 
system dynamics/KVA models to improve Analysis of Alternatives and acquisition. Additional 
research can extend this work toward implementation and expanded application. 
Opportunities include:  
• Modeling a specific acquisition program in support of its Analysis of 
Alternatives process can develop and demonstrate the capability of 
operationalizing the approach tested here.  
• If important uncertainties in system operations are incorporated into the 
system dynamics model it can be used to generate distributions of KVA 
productivities. These can be used to estimate the volatilities used in real 
options analysis, which has been demonstrated to be useful in DoD 





• The application of integrated system dynamics/KVA modeling to DoD product 
life cycle management can be investigated by using the model to generate 
forecasts of performance and KVA ratios during acquisition, comparing those 
forecasts with actual operations, and using the results to improve the model 
fidelity with the system. The improved model can then be used to analyze 
proposed changes or replacement of the system throughout its life cycle.  
The Analysis of Alternatives is a particularly challenging part of DoD acquisition. 
Integrating system dynamics modeling and the Knowledge Value Added approach has been 
shown to be capable of improving that analysis and, thereby, alternative selection. Adapting 
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